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corporate boards showed that more 
prospective directors turned down 
offers to serve in 1979 than in any of 
the prior seven years. Of the firms 
surveyed, 13 percent had at least one 
candidate turn them down. A wel l-
known, prestigious corporate name 
did not prevent this phenomenon 
either. The 128 firms surveyed, which 
had sales over $1 bi l l ion, experienced 
a turndown rate that was three times 
that of 1978. 
The way the nominating commit-
tee goes about the critical job of 
selecting candidates and getting the 
acceptances of its future board 
members is a vital assignment. The 
committee has to be sure that various 
constituencies are represented and 
yet do not upset the balance of view-
points on the board as a whole. As 
more minorities, academicians, and 
representatives of various social con-
cerns become board members, the 
manner in which the committee is 
structured—the nature, breadth, and 
objectivity of the candidates that 
satisfy these needs—will be critical 
to the future direction of the cor-
poration. 
What all this says to me is that the 
nominating committee is an increas-
ingly important part of the corporate 
world. At present, and hopefully in 
the future, it can be viewed as a 
means by which the corporate world 
can deal voluntarily with some of the 
major criticisms being leveled at it. 
In short, our boards are respond-
ing to the reasonable demands for 
accountability from a variety of con-
stituencies. And the nominating 
committee's efforts to help the cor-
poration balance the needs of share-
holders, employees, and the commu-
nity is squarely in the middle of this 
action. It is a tough and pivotal mid-
dle, in fact, and perhaps the fulcrum 
on which wil l turn the corporation's 
future course of action. £ 
Notes from the Boardroom 
by RODERICK M. HILLS/Former Chairman, SEC 
The following excerpts are from a 
presentation made at a Houston 
directors' seminar by Mr. Hills, a 
partner in the law firm of Latham, 
Watkins & Hills. 
Ifirst joined a company that had directors and stockholders back in 
1960. It was a small electronics com-
pany, and as I walked into the room, I 
saw an older gentleman sitting at the 
table. He was obviously a veteran of 
these meetings, and I said to him, 
kind of shyly, "What is it that we're 
supposed to decide here?" He said, 
"Well, Sonny, you come into each 
board meeting, and you just ask 
yourself one question: Should we fire 
the boss? If the answer turns out to 
be no, just keep your mouth shut, 
and smile a lot." 
Today, we're asked by the law to 
make a lot more decisions. But I ser-
iously question whether any of these 
mandated decisions are helpful to 
the primary mission of directors, 
which should be the corporation's 
productivity and profitability. 
As a director, it is my responsibility 
to know what the other directors 
bring to the table. Is there sufficient 
experience in the group to provide an 
overview for this company? By rea-
son of background, training, knowl-
edge, intelligence, does this group 
have the minimum ability needed to 
judge the business? I didn't choose 
them. Probably the president did. But 
isn't it my responsibility, the board's 
responsibility, to look around each 
year and decide? And that evaluation 
should be done, it seems to me, 
before the old slate is renominated 
just on the grounds that we all play 
golf together a couple of times a year. 
One day some judge is going to 
proclaim in a learned opinion 
whether or not a board has a suffi-
ciently independent character to 
make the decisions a board needs to 
make. If he's my kind of judge, he 
won't much care whether there is a 
given number of outside directors 
and so many inside directors. He 
won't very much care whether there 
is a nominating committee or what 
the board's structure is. What wi l l 
matter is that there is real indepen-
dence, and that it is being exercised 
to decide whether to reject a tend-
er offer, to go private, or to approve 
a company's pricing mechanism. 
Rather than have the SEC tell us 
how directors should act, the courts 
can cause this standard of indepen-
dence to evolve, based on practical 
experience and proper corporate 
performance. The judicial role—so 
played—will be to bring the more 
deficient companies up to that stan-
dard. That, after all, is how the com-
mon law evolved in this nation. & 
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